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OVERVIEW — This background paper describes the history and political evo-
lution of Medicaid’s disproportionate share hospital (DSH) program and ex-
amines DSH as it exists today. It highlights the importance of DSH payments
for the viability of safety net hospitals and considers the consequences of states’
creative financing strategies for maximizing federal Medicaid matching funds.
Finally, this paper reviews several options for improving the structure and
effectiveness of the DSH program.
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Medicaid’s Disproportionate
Share Hospital Program: Complex
Structure, Critical Payments
Today, nearly 45 million Americans lack health insurance coverage. In
2004, uninsured persons will incur medical care expenditures approach-
ing $125 billion, with an estimated $40 billion of that in the form of un-
compensated care.1 The uninsured gain access to health care services
through a “safety net” that includes public hospitals, private nonprofit
hospitals, community health centers, and some private physicians, all of
whom help shoulder the burden of uncompensated care. While a broad
range of providers serve uninsured patients, the largest share of uncom-
pensated care, in dollar terms, is delivered by hospitals.
Safety net hospitals serve predominantly low-income communities and
have substantial caseloads of Medicaid patients whose costs frequently
are not covered by Medicaid reimbursement rates. Often, these hospitals
are also the principal source of care for uninsured patients in their com-
munities. They include general inpatient facilities, some of which are teach-
ing hospitals, as well as specialty facilities such as psychiatric hospitals.
Although all safety net hospitals provide inpatient care, many also pro-
vide outpatient services through hospital-based clinics. Safety net insti-
tutions typically have small caseloads of private patients, limiting the
extent to which they can “cost shift” by charging higher rates to private
insurers. As a result, many safety net hospitals rely on some public finan-
cial support to sustain their charitable missions.
Congress established the Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH)
program in 1981 to help ensure that states provide adequate financial
support to hospitals that serve a significant number of low-income pa-
tients with special needs. Recognizing that safety net hospitals typically
incur higher uncompensated care costs than other hospitals and rely
heavily on Medicaid, which historically has low reimbursement rates,
Congress authorized DSH payments to assist states in financing the pro-
grams. Congress also established DSH payments for hospitals under
Medicare’s prospective payment system. Over the past two decades, DSH
programs have become a major source of funding for the nation’s safety
net hospitals. In 2002, the federal government provided $9 billion in
matching funds for state Medicaid DSH programs and $6.2 billion in
direct DSH payments through Medicare.2 These payments represent
about two-thirds of the $22.3 billion in uncompensated care costs re-
ported by hospitals in 2002.
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Although safety net hospitals often receive appropriations from state and
local governments to subsidize the costs of serving the uninsured, DSH
funding has become a lifeline for many large institutions. Survey data
collected by the National Association of Public Hospitals (NAPH) indi-
cate that Medicaid DSH payments fund 25 percent of unreimbursed costs
for NAPH members while the Medicare DSH program funds about 6 per-
cent.3 Medicaid and Medicare DSH dollars are also important funding
sources for many rural providers.
However, Medicaid DSH became mired in controversy as states discov-
ered unforeseen opportunities to maximize federal funds and reduce state
matching contributions. Medicaid DSH spending skyrocketed from less
than $600 million in 1989 to more than $17 billion by 1992 (Figure 1). The
Congress and several administrations have taken steps to control the
growth of state DSH programs and curtail inappropriate financing
schemes, enacting major program changes in 1991, 1993, 1997, and 2000.
At the same time, many in Congress view Medicaid DSH as a critical
safety net funding source. Congress recently increased state DSH allot-
ments as part of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. Experts gener-
ally agree that reforms are needed but that they must be undertaken with
extreme care to minimize damage to safety net providers that have come
to rely on these funds.
FIGURE 1
Federal and State Medicaid DSH Expenditures,
1989–2002 (in billions)
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, CMS-64 financial management reports.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEDICAID DSH
Prior to 1981, Medicaid based its payments to hospitals on reasonable
costs for services provided to program beneficiaries. Congress was con-
cerned that this “cost-based reimbursement” was inherently inflationary.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA 1981) enabled
states to experiment with prospective hospital payments as long as reim-
bursement was “reasonable and necessary to the efficient and economi-
cal delivery of services.” Congress was concerned, however, that this
change could harm hospitals serving large numbers of Medicaid and
uninsured patients. Therefore, it required states to “take into account the
situation of hospitals which serve a disproportionate share of low-income
patients with special needs.” The Medicaid DSH program was intended
to improve the financial stability of these hospitals and preserve access to
quality health services for low-income patients. Because the requirement
was broad and vague, many states ignored it. By 1985, only 17 states had
initiated DSH programs.
Congress attempted to remedy this problem in the Omnibus Reconcili-
ation Act of 1987 (OBRA 1987) by establishing a federal definition for
DSH hospitals and requiring states to make payments to these facili-
ties.4 The definition included hospitals with (a) a Medicaid utilization
rate of one standard deviation or more above the mean Medicaid utili-
zation rate in the state or (b) a low-income utilization rate of 25 percent
or more.5 OBRA 1987 also established broad parameters for DSH pay-
ment adjustments that included (a) applying the Medicare DSH formula
to Medicaid’s base inpatient payments or (b) paying a proportional in-
crease based on hospitals’ Medicaid or low-income utilization rates.
However, OBRA 1987 allowed states to designate additional DSH-eli-
gible hospitals and set reimbursement levels. As a result, DSH payments
varied considerably across states.
State Creative Financing Strategies
In 1985, the Health Care Financing Administration, or HCFA (now the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or CMS) ruled that states could
use hospital taxes and donations to fund the nonfederal share of Medicaid
DSH payments. This set the stage for creative financing approaches that
could generate new federal funds without matching state contributions.
Several factors made this possible. First, Medicaid financing is shared be-
tween states and the federal government. Each dollar of allowable state
Medicaid spending generates federal matching funds according to a fed-
eral medical assistance percentage (FMAP) that ranges from 50 percent to
77 percent based on a state’s per capita income.6 Second, OBRA 1987 main-
tained state flexibility to designate DSH hospitals and set payment levels,
allowing states to direct new Medicaid payments to specific providers. Fi-
nally, the federal government did not establish any limits on the amount of
state DSH payments eligible for federal matching funds.
DSH was intended to
improve the financial
stability of hospitals
and preserve access to
care for low-income
patients.
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In the late 1980s several states, starting with West Virginia, determined
that it would be permissible to collect donations from hospitals, use the
donations to draw down federal matching funds, and make DSH pay-
ments to those same hospitals without actually putting up state dollars.7
Figure 2 illustrates how the process worked. In this example, a state col-
lects $10 million from a hospital through a provider tax, donation, or trans-
fer. The state then makes a $12 million DSH payment back to the hospital
and draws down $6 million in federal funds (assuming a 50 percent fed-
eral matching percentage). At the end of the transaction, the hospital has
a net gain of $2 million ($12 million DSH payment minus $10 million
donation) while the state’s net gain is $4 million ($10 million donation
plus $6 million federal match minus $12 million DSH payment). As other
states began to grasp the implications of West Virginia’s approach, they
rushed to establish their own programs.
By the early 1990s, alarm bells were going off in Washington as the growth
in DSH payments became apparent and stories of inappropriate use of
funds began to emerge. Most states did not report how they used funds
generated by DSH. In many cases, states used new federal money to en-
hance payments for safety net providers or expand coverage for low-in-
come populations. Others used the funds to replace state dollars in the
budget—often as an alternative to cutting Medicaid eligibility in the face
of double-digit spending growth. Federal officials were most concerned by
reports that some states had diverted federal Medicaid funds for unrelated
FIGURE 2
Illustrative Example of a DSH Program
Source: Urban Institute, 2000.
IGT=Intergovernmental transfer
FFP= federal financial participation (federal match)
Provider State Federal
$10 Million 
Tax, IGT, or Donation
$12 Million
Medicaid DSH Payment
$6 Million
FFP Reimbursement
+$10M from hospital
+$6M federal match
-$12M paid to hospital
+$4M net
+$12M from state
-$10M paid to state
+$2M net -$6M FFP paid to state
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purposes. They were also concerned about reports of “recycling” where
states would use excess DSH funds as the state share of new Medicaid
expenditures to draw down additional federal payments. Certain states
established DSH payments far in excess of what Congress would likely
consider reasonable or rational. For example, in 1992, DSH payments were
51 percent of total Medicaid program spending in New Hampshire, 36
percent in Louisiana, and 31 percent in Missouri.8
Congressional Restrictions on Medicaid DSH
Congress’s first major action to curb state abuses came with the Medicaid
Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991
(P.L. 102-234). The law banned most provider donations and required that
provider taxes be (a) broad based, (b) uniformly imposed, and (c) struc-
tured so that providers are not held harmless for the cost of the tax. Con-
gress also passed state-specific DSH allotments and limited future growth
in these allotments to the annual rate of increase in total Medicaid spend-
ing. The new law substantially reduced states’ use of provider taxes to
fund Medicaid and put the brakes on growth in total DSH payments.
However, it also locked in large inequities in states’ ability to utilize DSH
that persist today. A few states made major program changes to preserve
federal funding they expected to lose. The most notable example was
Tennessee, which negotiated an exceptionally generous federal Section
1115 Medicaid waiver to implement broad eligibility expansions under a
new managed care program called Tenncare. While the new law elimi-
nated the mechanism Tennessee had used to finance a large proportion of
its Medicaid program, the waiver preserved the high levels of funding
Tennessee received prior to the 1991 reforms.
The 1991 restrictions were the beginning of a continuing conflict over Med-
icaid financing. Most states found they could not muster political support
for allowable provider taxes that required some hospitals to pay new taxes
that would not be reimbursed through DSH payments. Instead many states
shifted to intergovernmental transfer (IGT) programs. Under IGTs, state or
local governments that operate hospitals transfer funds to Medicaid as the
state match for DSH payments. Under this arrangement, states directed a
large share of DSH payments to a relatively small number of public hospi-
tals. In a 1994 report, the General Accounting Office (now the Government
Accountability Office), or GAO, identified IGT programs that allowed
Michigan, Tennessee, and Texas to obtain about $800 million in federal
Medicaid matching funds without committing state funds.9
In the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress imposed hospital-
specific DSH caps, limiting payments to 100 percent of unreimbursed
costs of care for Medicaid and uninsured patients. The law provided a
transition period for “high-volume” DSH hospitals, capping payments
at 200 percent in fiscal year (FY) 1995 and 100 percent in FY 1996. Al-
though the hospital-specific DSH caps reduced states’ ability to game
Certain states estab-
lished DSH payments
far in excess of what
Congress would likely
consider reasonable or
rational.
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the DSH program, Congress has since created exceptions to the caps for
certain states and hospital categories.10
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 cut Medicaid DSH payments fur-
ther, reducing state allotments by 8.6 percent between 1998 and 2002 and
limited spending on institutions for mental disease (IMDs). Since its incep-
tion, Medicaid has specifically excluded coverage for services delivered to
patients between the ages of 21 and 64 in an IMD.11 Since many IMDs are
state-owned, patient care in these facilities has been state-funded. Recog-
nizing that the “IMD exclusion” relates only to reimbursement for services
and that DSH payments need not be linked to specific patients or services,
many states in the early 1990s substituted Medicaid DSH funding for state
IMD funding, in some cases generating large financial windfalls.12 The BBA
limited IMD spending to 33 percent of a state’s total DSH payments, re-
ducing windfalls for certain states. Finally, the BBA required states to sub-
mit data to HCFA documenting DSH payments to individual hospitals.
In 2000, Congress passed the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits
Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA). The law eliminated the BBA’s
DSH cuts for FY 2001 and FY 2002 and reinstated an annual increase in
state allotments based on the consumer price index. But BIPA allowed
the full BBA cuts to become effective in FY 2003, creating what has been
called the “DSH cliff.” The DSH cliff went into effect as scheduled, reduc-
ing state allotments by 11.6 percent. However, the Medicare Prescription
Drug Improvement and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 increased 2004
state allotments by 16 percent. For most states, the allotments in the drug
bill will remain level in subsequent years, but low DSH states (those with
allotments less than 3 percent of total Medicaid spending) receive a 16
percent annual increase through 2009—doubling their allotments over a
five-year period.
The DSH program’s history illustrates inherent tensions in Congress be-
tween those who want to use Medicaid as a vehicle to finance care for
low-income uninsured persons and those who want to control the growth
in federal Medicaid payments. Congressional action to limit federal DSH
funding has often been followed by new legislation to increase it, as illus-
trated by passage of the MMA. The BIPA of 2000 simultaneously increased
DSH caps for public hospitals and eliminated state loopholes for using
Medicaid upper payment limits (see sidebar, page 9—UPL: A New State
Approach). Medicaid policymaking has been intensely political and rife
with special deals such as the 1997 exemptions to hospital-specific DSH
limits for California hospitals. Members of Congress who oppose Medic-
aid fiscal gamesmanship often support their own governors when state
funding is on the line.
The Continuing Federal-State Conflict
The most recent federal action to rein in special Medicaid hospital pay-
ments came in a January 2004 CMS proposal to review state plans for
Congressional action
to limit federal DSH
funding has often
been followed by leg-
islation to increase it.
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Medicaid spending prospectively. The pro-
posal, which was buried in the January 7
Federal Register and had a one-day comment
period, caused an outcry. On February 20,
Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) Secretary Tommy Thompson de-
layed plans to implement these changes and
announced a “consultation period” with the
National Governors Association. The con-
tinuing duel between states and federal
regulators has created substantial animos-
ity without much progress towards more
rational policies. Efforts are hampered
by a lack of reliable data detailing what is
actually happening in state programs.
States have resisted attempts to develop
accurate reporting systems, fearing that this
would be an initial step toward reduced
funding. States are unlikely to cooperate
without a roadmap for reform they perceive
as equitable.
CURRENT STATUS
OF MEDICAID DSH
The Medicaid DSH program as it exists to-
day is an amalgam of 50 state programs
with different rules, varying resource lev-
els, and few reporting requirements. While
federal legislation enacted in the 1990s es-
sentially halted the program’s exponential
growth, Congress continued to allow state
flexibility to structure DSH programs
within federal funding constraints. DSH
payments declined from 14 percent of total
Medicaid spending in 1992 to about 7 per-
cent in 2002. However, the federal DSH al-
lotments locked in funding inequities that
arose between states that aggressively
maximized DSH payments early on and
those that were slow to follow. In 2001, five states reported DSH pay-
ments of at least $1,000 per resident below 100 percent of the federal
poverty level, while 16 states reported payments of less than $100 per
low-income resident (Table 1, see Appendix).
Despite evidence that many major safety net hospitals rely heavily on
Medicaid DSH, the program’s impact on care to the poor is difficult to
Following the DSH restrictions, states continued to explore new
revenue maximization strategies, perhaps most significantly up-
per payment limit (UPL) programs.13 Federal law states that
Medicaid programs cannot make payments in excess of what
“would have been paid under Medicare principles”—the UPL.
Originally, this restriction was designed to limit the federal
government’s liability for Medicaid matching payments. How-
ever, states now use the UPL as a rationale for new supplemen-
tal payments that help them increase federal Medicaid revenue.
States are required to certify that Medicaid payments do not
exceed the Medicare UPL in state plans submitted to the fed-
eral government. However, there is no standard methodology
for calculating the UPL, which is applied as an aggregate pay-
ment limit for broad classes of providers such as hospitals and
nursing homes. Medicaid DSH payments are excluded from
the UPL calculation.
In the mid-1990s, several states saw an opportunity to use the
“room under the upper limit” as a rationale for supplemental
payment programs. There were very few federal limits on
supplemental payments, so that states could make large UPL
payments to individual providers while remaining within ag-
gregate limits.  States structured UPL programs much like the
original DSH programs—using provider taxes or intergovern-
mental transfers as the state share to generate federal matching
funds, then making supplemental payments back to contribut-
ing providers.
A 2001 analysis by the DHHS Office of the Inspector General
identified 28 state UPL programs accounting for more than $10
billion in FY 2000 Medicaid payments.14 Evidence to date sug-
gests that states retain a relatively high percentage of UPL pro-
gram gains rather than paying them to providers.15 CMS modi-
fied its UPL regulation to establish aggregate caps for three cat-
egories of hospitals (private, state, and public nonstate) in 2001
but did not enact limits on provider-specific UPL payments. In
contrast, the GAO has a longstanding recommendation that
Congress limit UPL payments to provider costs.16
UPL: A NEW STATE APPROACH
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document with precision. Federal officials struggle to make informed deci-
sions in the absence of basic program information, including the following:
■ How are individual state DSH programs structured?
■ What proportion of reported DSH payments are available to finance
care for low-income patients after netting out funds returned to states
through provider taxes and IGTs?
■ What proportion of net DSH payments go to safety net as opposed to
non–safety net hospitals?
■ How much funding do state and local governments actually contrib-
ute to Medicaid DSH?
State Medicaid DSH Program Structure
While each state DSH program is unique, several general approaches are
relatively common. One is for states to structure programs using the OBRA
1987 guidelines that defined DSH hospitals. For example, in Wisconsin,
qualifying hospitals must have a low-income utilization rate (LIUR) of at
least 25 percent or a Medicaid utilization rate that is one standard devia-
tion above the statewide mean. Qualifying hospitals are paid using an add-
on to the Medicaid DRG rate that ranges from 3.0 percent to 4.5 percent,
depending on each hospital’s LIUR. Wisconsin’s DSH program is relatively
modest, with payments of about $50 million in 2002.17 The state share of
DSH is financed predominantly with general revenues, although Wiscon-
sin also uses an IGT from Milwaukee County to help finance the county’s
General Assistance Medical Program. This OBRA 1987 approach is more
common for states with small DSH programs and few public hospitals.
Another general approach is illustrated by states that direct the majority
of DSH funds to public hospitals—creating a structure where the state
share of DSH payments can be financed through intergovernmental trans-
fers. In California, both public and private hospitals are eligible for DSH
if they meet the OBRA 1987 guidelines. However, DSH payments are based
on a mathematical formula designed to achieve a predetermined distri-
bution of payments between public and private hospitals. The formula
takes into account hospital type and LIUR and rewards Medicaid days
more than charity care. Funds not expended in base payments are dis-
tributed through supplemental payments to remaining DSH hospitals. In
2002, approximately one-third of California hospitals received DSH pay-
ments that totaled approximately $1.4 billion. The state share is financed
primarily through IGTs from counties and the University of California.
A third general approach is to make DSH payments to virtually all hospi-
tals in the state. Such programs typically exist in states, such as New York,
Massachusetts, and Ohio, that finance DSH payments in part through a
provider tax. New York, for example, has an indigent care pool that quali-
fies for federal matching funds under the DSH program. Hospitals qualify
for pool payments if their bad debt and charity care costs are at least 0.5
While each state DSH
program is unique,
several general ap-
proaches are relatively
common.
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percent of total hospital costs. As a result, virtually all New York hospi-
tals receive DSH payments. The state pays between 60 and 100 percent of
hospitals’ uncompensated care costs, depending on their bad debt and
charity care percentage. New York also has created supplemental DSH
programs for public hospitals. New York’s FY 2002 DSH payments were
about $2.9 billion. The state’s share of indigent care pool payments is
financed by a uniform assessment on hospital’s private-sector charges
and an insurer assessment. The state’s share of the public-sector DSH
programs is financed primarily by IGTs.
Net DSH Payments to Hospitals
Despite success limiting aggregate growth in Medicaid DSH payments,
federal officials remain concerned about whether states actually use these
funds to support hospital uncompensated care. The federal government
requires states to report hospital-specific DSH payments to CMS but does
not require hospital-specific information about transfers back to states
through provider taxes and intergovernmental transfers. As a result, these
reports provide little insight into what is really happening to DSH funds.
The Urban Institute, however, has conducted state surveys on the sources
and uses of Medicaid DSH funds for FY 1993, FY 1997, and FY 2001.18 The
2001 survey includes DSH data from 32 states accounting for about two-
thirds of that year’s total payments. Although the survey data are not a
complete or audited accounting of Medicaid DSH programs, they do of-
fer the most comprehensive picture of DSH financing available to date.
The surveys also illustrate how state programs have evolved over time in
response to federal legislative changes.
States responding to the Urban Institute’s DSH survey reported $10.7 bil-
lion in total DSH payments. Of this amount, net DSH gains to hospitals
or state governments (defined by the Urban Institute as federal matching
funds) were $6.2 billion (Table 2, see Appendix). Almost 74 percent of the
net DSH gains went to private or nonstate hospitals, 15 percent went to
state hospitals, and 11 percent were kept by states as residual funds. In
2002, the federal government made $9 billion in matching payments on
total reported DSH payments of $15.9 billion. Extrapolating from the sur-
vey percentages suggests that hospitals received $8.1 billion in 2002 net
DSH payments (total DSH payments minus provider taxes and IGTs).
However, this amount understates net DSH payments to hospitals be-
cause the Urban Institute’s definition does not include payments financed
by state general revenues.
The distribution of DSH gains varies by state (Table 3, see Appendix). For
example, New Jersey made $699 million in DSH payments to private hos-
pitals while drawing down $577 million in federal matching funds for
DSH, suggesting that the state contributed at least $122 million in state
general revenues to fund DSH payments to private hospitals. Nine of the
32 survey states made net state DSH contributions, although these were
12
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relatively modest in all but New Jersey and Connecticut. In contrast, some
states captured large DSH gains. For example, Louisiana financed its 2001
DSH program predominantly with state appropriations but made the
majority of DSH payments to state hospitals. In 2001, Louisiana’s net state
gain was almost $540 million. However, Louisiana did not report a trans-
fer of funds from state hospitals back to the general fund, suggesting that
the gains finance health services delivered at state hospitals.
DSH Payments to Safety Net Hospitals
Hospitals are the nation’s largest providers of uncompensated care, de-
livering a substantially larger volume of services to low-income patients
than community health centers, local clinics, or private physicians. Med-
icaid DSH is the largest source of federal funding for uncompensated
hospital care. However, the burden of uncompensated care is highly vari-
able across hospitals, and policymakers are justifiably interested in un-
derstanding how well payments are targeted to safety net providers.
A September 2002 report prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) by RAND and the Urban Insti-
tute identifies four major dimensions of safety net hospitals. The hospital
must have a legal mandate or mission to serve individuals regardless of
their ability to pay, provide service to vulnerable populations (for example,
uninsured persons, homeless persons, those with substance abuse prob-
lems or mental illness), provide a disproportionate amount of care to low-
income populations, and make available specialized services such as
trauma care and emergency room services.19 The structure of the health
care safety net varies from community to community. In cities such as
Dallas and Los Angeles, the majority of hospital care provided to unin-
sured and Medicaid patients is concentrated in a small number of public
hospitals. In cities such as New York and Detroit, care for the uninsured
is shared across a broad range of institutions.20 Therefore, the health care
safety net includes hospitals that vary in size, location, and governance.
The ASPE study analyzed the distribution of DSH payments across hos-
pitals and estimated that 64 percent of net Medicaid DSH payments went
to hospitals with at least 30 percent low-income patients while 80 percent
of net payments went to hospitals with at least 20 percent low-income
patients.21 Furthermore, it found that 63 percent of net Medicaid DSH
payments went to hospitals with Medicaid utilization rates at least one
standard deviation above their statewide average. Roughly 75 percent of
net Medicaid DSH payments went to hospitals that had negative total
margins before receiving these payments. These findings imply that DSH
cuts would result in service reductions for uninsured patients. The ASPE
study conducted simulations of Medicaid DSH payments using alterna-
tive distribution formulas. The authors concluded that the current distri-
bution of net DSH payments targets financially vulnerable safety net
hospitals at least as well as alternatives examined in the report.
Medicaid DSH is the
largest source of federal
funding for uncompen-
sated hospital care.
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Taken together, the Urban Institute’s DSH survey and the ASPE study sug-
gest that the majority of federal DSH funds accrue to hospitals and that a
substantial proportion of these funds flow to safety net institutions. How-
ever, the extent to which DSH funds can be considered well-targeted to
safety net institutions varies across states. Safety net providers in states
with low DSH allotments receive very limited DSH funding. This remains
a major gap in the program’s ability to target payments to providers with
the greatest need.
Although recent research has provided improved insight into the
program’s financial flows, very little is known about how hospitals use
DSH funding to render care to uninsured patients. To assess this issue
in greater detail, DHHS sponsored another study by the Urban Insti-
tute to examine selected programs that use DSH funds to enhance care
for uninsured patients.22
The experience of Denver Health (DH) illustrates the role of DSH in sup-
porting a local safety net program. DH, the principal source of care for
uninsured patients in the Denver metropolitan area, includes a 350-bed
hospital, 11 federally qualified community health centers, the local health
department, and 12 school-based clinics. In 1991, DH faced a $40 million
operating deficit, but a rapid infusion of Medicaid DSH funding in the
1990s was a critical factor in DH’s subsequent financial turnaround. Be-
tween 1991 and 2000, DH received nearly $320 million in DSH funding. In
1999, DH provided approximately $75 million in care to the uninsured, $39
million of which was supported by net DSH payments. In addition to sup-
porting direct care, Medicaid DSH has allowed DH eliminate its operating
deficit, invest in new infrastructure, and reorganize into a vertically inte-
grated delivery system that can deliver care in a more coordinated and
cost-effective manner.
State and Local Government Contributions to Medicaid DSH
Congressionally mandated restrictions on provider taxes caused a ma-
jor shift in Medicaid DSH financing. According to the Urban Institute
survey, local government funding used to finance the state share of DSH
payments increased from 27 percent in 1993 to 47 percent in 2001, while
provider taxes declined from almost 50 percent of the state share in 1993
to 11.6 percent in 2001 (Table 4, see Appendix). Local government funds
are considered a legitimate source of Medicaid financing. According to
federal statute, up to 60 percent of the state share may come from local
sources. States have a long history of local government revenue shar-
ing. For example, New York has long required that county governments
contribute part of the state share of Medicaid. Similarly, provider-
specific taxes are legitimate sources of state funds if they conform to
CMS regulations. The critical question is not whether states use local
funding to finance the state share, but whether reported DSH payments
are valid expenditures for hospital services.
According to federal
statute, up to 60 per-
cent of the state share
may come from local
sources.
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Congressionally mandated hospital-specific DSH caps can substantially
reduce state governments’ ability to generate excess federal matching pay-
ments through the DSH program. Under caps that limit payments to 100
percent of hospitals’ unreimbursed costs, states can still use intergovern-
mental transfers as the state share of DSH but cannot hold local govern-
ments harmless for the cost of these transfers. If a county hospital has $10
million in unreimbursed costs, a state cannot make DSH payments to the
hospital in excess of this amount. Figure 3 illustrates that a state with a 75
percent federal matching rate could use a $2.5 million county IGT to draw
down $7.5 million in federal matching funds and then make a $10 million
DSH payment without appropriating state funds. The county hospital has
a net DSH payment of $7.5 million (DSH payment less IGT) but also has
unreimbursed costs of $10 million. Therefore, the county has to finance the
remaining $2.5 million in unreimbursed costs. This example illustrates that
the 100 percent DSH cap requires either state or local government to con-
tribute the full statutory nonfederal share of the Medicaid DSH payment.
However, when hospital-specific DSH caps are raised above 100 percent
(as is the case under BIPA for public hospitals in 2004 and 2005), states can
still generate excess DSH payments that may be used to finance other health
care services for low-income patients or diverted for other purposes.
THE FUTURE OF MEDICAID DSH AND FEDERAL
SUPPORT FOR THE HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET
Medicaid DSH provides essential funding to many safety net hospitals.
In this capacity, the program helps maintain access to health services for
low-income patients. While federal legislation has corrected many of the
problems that occurred in the program’s early years, Medicaid DSH still
has significant flaws:
■ Lack of transparency and financial controls. Medicaid DSH lacks
oversight mechanisms and financial controls that one would expect in a
large government program. Studies by the GAO and others discuss
how problems with oversight and management result in questionable
federal expenditures.23 The absence of reliable data protects states that
engage in questionable practices and limits the momentum of efforts to
change the program in ways that would benefit low-income patients.
■ Inequity across states. The Medicaid DSH program is highly inequi-
table. States with large DSH allotments receive substantially more
federal DSH funding than those with smaller allotments. State allot-
ments are not based on need, but rather on historical program spending
levels at the time when the federal government established state DSH
allotments. States that were most effective in maximizing DSH funding
in the early years have continued to benefit for more than a decade.
■ Lack of incentives for delivery system reform. The DSH program
perpetuates a hospital-centric model of health care delivery. DSH does
not fund nonhospital services and accordingly does not provide
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incentives for investment in primary care and prevention programs
designed to keep patients healthy and out of the hospital.
Enacting change will be difficult. Federal officials are reluctant to invest
in a program some view as a raid on the federal treasury. Yet major re-
form without a new infusion of federal money will create shortfalls for
certain states and providers that have come to rely on DSH funds.
Options for Change
Proposals for structural changes to DSH policies that address the three
major issues highlighted above include the following options:
Establishing New Medicaid DSH Reporting Systems and Financial
Controls — The federal government continues to struggle with the no-
tion of state flexibility in reviewing and approving financing methodolo-
gies. In 2002, the GAO added Medicaid to its list of “high-risk” programs,
citing lack of financial controls over states claims for federal matching.24
The Bush administration has proposed establishing Medicaid block grants
to reduce federal exposure to future growth in program costs and give
states more management flexibility. Yet a recent report for the Kaiser Fam-
ily Foundation argues that improving financial management within the
current program structure is a viable alternative to more radical restruc-
turing of the federal-state Medicaid partnership.25 The report identifies a
variety of specific actions to be considered, including the following:
■ Creating a Medicaid financial oversight board.
■ Developing a comprehensive plan for Medicaid fiscal integrity.
■ Further clarifying allowable Medicaid funding sources.
■ Publishing an upper payment limit methodology and applying it
consistently across all states.
■ Auditing supplemental payment programs.
■ Redesigning CMS Medicaid information systems to collect key
financial data from states.
■ Reporting on effective matching rates.
In addition to controlling costs and reducing Medicaid’s exposure to abuse,
stronger fiscal controls would limit manipulations that create temporary
winners, inequities among states, and financial dislocations when new
rules are implemented to eliminate loopholes.
If improved transparency and accountability are considered priority ar-
eas for Medicaid DSH reform, the federal government could develop
national standards for reporting hospital uncompensated care and a pro-
cess for collecting consistent data on the volume of care delivered to
low-income and uninsured patients. Some states, like Massachusetts,
have specific definitions for charity care and require that hospitals docu-
ment patients’ financial status before they can receive uncompensated
care funding. However, the only national data source is the American
The federal govern-
ment continues to
struggle with the no-
tion of state flexibility
with respect to Medic-
aid financing.
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Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey. Hospitals do not use consis-
tent definitions for reporting bad debt and charity care to the AHA, nor is
there any way to determine what proportion of this care is provided to
uninsured patients. Furthermore, the AHA data are neither audited nor
publicly available. National uncompensated care reporting standards
would assist both the federal and state governments in targeting DSH
payments to more precisely meet policy goals.
Federalizing Medicaid DSH Payments — Another way to control fed-
eral DSH payments and ensure a more equitable distribution of funds
would be to establish a uniform federal Medicaid DSH program. Federal
payments would go directly to hospitals, eliminating opportunities for
states to engage in financial manipulations. Under this scenario, states
could also make DSH payments, but these would not be eligible for fed-
eral matching funds.
Medicare already has a uniform federal DSH program. However,
Medicare’s current qualification criteria and payment formulas are not
appropriate for Medicaid DSH. The ASPE analysis found that a smaller
proportion of Medicare DSH payments went to hospitals with high ratios
of low-income patients than the current state-based Medicaid DSH pro-
gram. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission has recommended
that Congress require disproportionate share payments be distributed
according to each hospital’s share of low-income patient costs—defined
broadly to include all care to the poor delivered in both inpatient and
outpatient settings.26 However, the ASPE study demonstrates that addi-
tional research and better data are needed to ensure payments are effec-
tively targeted to hospitals with the greatest need.
The most difficult issue facing a federal Medicaid DSH program would
be determining the level and distribution of funding. Some have sug-
gested increasing the proportion of Medicaid DSH payments directed at
hospitals that serve a very high percentage of low-income and uninsured
patients.27 This approach is appealing to those who advocate greater fed-
eral support for “true” safety net providers. But such a change would
result in large redistributions relative to the current structure.
Developing New Funding Models to Support Integrated Systems of
Charity Care — A third option would be a new comprehensive institu-
tional financing program for safety net providers designed to replace the
existing patchwork of state and federal payments. By establishing stable,
predictable, multiyear funding to support a full continuum of services for
low-income patients, this option could create a financial structure that en-
courages integrated, coordinated systems of care. This approach could be
structured like a global budget, providing selected safety net providers
with the flexibility and financial incentives to treat patients in the most
appropriate, cost-effective settings. Such a program would need to incor-
porate accountability guidelines and require health systems to demonstrate
measurable progress in improving patient safety, service quality, and com-
munity health status in order to qualify for continued funding.
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CONCLUSION
DSH is a critical source of financing for health care provided to low-
income and uninsured patients; however, it continues to be a focal point
in the federal-state battle over Medicaid financing. The DSH program is
complex and lacks good reporting systems and financial controls. Con-
troversy over states’ use of DSH programs to enhance federal Medicaid
matching funds sometimes overshadows the importance of directing
necessary funding to institutions that serve low-income patients. Further-
more, growth of supplemental payment programs like DSH that are fi-
nanced by provider taxes and IGTs greatly complicates Medicaid program
evaluation and oversight. In the absence of a viable plan to broadly expand
health insurance coverage, support for providers that serve low-income
patients will become increasingly critical. It is essential that states and the
federal government come together to design funding strategies that equi-
tably and effectively strengthen the nation’s health care safety net.
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Percent of DSH Payment
2001 DSH Total per Resident DSH per
Payments Medicaid below Uninsured
(in thousands) Payments 100% FPL Person
U.S. Average $15,854,176 7.4% $482 $385
Alabama $366,738 12.8% $527 $640
Alaska $13,975 2.4% $259 $140
Arizona $102,774 3.9% $132 $108
Arkansas $22,685 1.2% $48 $53
California $1,926,284 8.1% $446 $287
Colorado $186,310 8.7% $486 $271
Connecticut $290,828 9.0% $1,168 $841
Delaware $4,140 0.7% $78 $57
District of Columbia $82,381 8.4% $816 $1,177
Florida $338,809 4.0% $163 $119
Georgia $425,146 8.4% $398 $309
Hawaii $0 0.0% $0 $0
Idaho $10,047 1.4% $67 $48
Illinois $379,004 4.9% $303 $226
Indiana $656,157 16.4% $1,284 $919
Iowa $14,273 0.9% $67 $66
Kansas $46,991 2.8% $176 $156
Kentucky $191,149 5.8% $380 $389
Louisiana $872,308 20.8% $1,230 $1,032
Maine $49,160 3.7% $372 $372
Maryland $62,822 1.9% $163 $96
Massachusetts $485,283 7.3% $865 $933
Michigan $431,720 6.0% $466 $420
Minnesota $64,322 1.7% $178 $164
Mississippi $178,733 7.3% $332 $389
Missouri $455,068 9.6% $847 $805
Montana $244 0.1% $2 $2
APPENDIX — TABLE 1
Medicaid DSH Expenditures
per Enrollee and per Uninsured Person, 2001
(continued on next page)
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APPENDIX — TABLE 1 (continued)
Percent of DSH Payment
2001 DSH Total per Resident DSH per
Payments Medicaid below Uninsured
(in thousands) Payments 100% FPLa Person
Nebraska $318 0.0% $2 $2
Nevada $76,042 11.3% $500 $221
New Hampshire $158,370 18.1% $1,955 $1,331
New Jersey $1,117,458 15.7% $1,636 $1,008
New Mexico $15,265 1.0% $47 $41
New York $2,455,754 7.8% $922 $842
North Carolina $415,288 6.8% $410 $356
North Dakota $1,061 0.3% $12 $18
Ohio $637,259 7.6% $543 $511
Oklahoma $22,702 1.1% $45 $37
Oregon $30,494 1.1% $75 $69
Pennsylvania $761,019 7.0% $657 $680
Rhode Island $81,058 6.8% $811 $1,013
South Carolina $371,948 12.3% $617 $754
South Dakota $1,075 0.2% $17 $16
Tennessee $0 0.0% $0 $0
Texas $1,346,134 11.6% $430 $271
Utah $724 0.1% $3 $2
Vermont $26,500 4.4% $449 $457
Virginia $236,402 7.8% $419 $305
Washington $327,824 7.6% $517 $420
West Virginia $102,034 6.6% $351 $436
Wisconsin $11,855 0.3% $28 $29
Wyoming $241 0.1% $6 $3
Source: National Association for Public Hospitals, Safety Net Financing: A Policy Sourcebook for
State Executives, June 2003.
Data from CMS-64 2001 annual reports and March 2002 current population survey.
aFPL = federal poverty level ($17,650 for a family of four in 2001).
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APPENDIX — TABLE 2
State Sources of Funds, Reported DSH Payments,
and Net DSH Payments by Entity in 2000:
Summary Results from 32 States
Amount Percent of Percent of
Sources of DSH Funds (in millions) Total State Share
Provider taxes $567.2 5.0 10.9
Local/county IGT $2,296.2 20.1 44.1
and CPEa
State transfers and CPEs $1,068.9 9.3 20.5
General appropriations $1,276.9 11.2 24.5
Federal Medicaid match $6,237.6 54.5 N/A
Total fundsb $11,446.8 100.0 100.0
Reported DSH Payments
Private acute hospitals $3,630.7 33.8 N/A
Public (nonstate)
acute hospitals $3,707.3 34.5 N/A
State acute hospitals $1,466.5 13.6 N/A
Private IMDsc $6.1 0.1 N/A
Public (nonstate) IMDs $110.8 1.0 N/A
State IMDs $1,823.4 17.0 N/A
Total DSH Payments $10,744.8 100.0
Net DSH Payments by Entity
Private or nonstate
hospitals $4,592.0 73.6
State hospitals $944.1 15.1
State residual funds $701.7 11.2
Total net paymentsd $6,237.8 100.0
Source: Urban Institute, Survey of UPL and DSH Programs, 2002.
aCPE = certified public expenditure
bSources of funds total exceeds DSH payments
total because certain states collect more than
they need to cover the state share of DSH pay-
ments.
cIMD = institution for mental disease
dTotal gains is equal to total federal matching
funds. A number of states make total DSH
payments above the federal matching funds
they receive. In the aggregate, states with net
payments are combined with states that have
net DSH gains.
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APPENDIX — TABLE 3
Net DSH Gains by Hospital Ownership and DSH Residual Funds in 32 States,
State Fiscal Year 2001
(dollars in millions)
Gains to Gains to State Net Percent of
Total  Private or Nonstate State Residual State Gain
DSH Gains Entitiesa Entitiesa Fundsb Gain to Statec
Total (32 States) $6,237.7 $4,592.0 $944.1 $701.7 $1,645.8 26.0
Alabama $257.0 $232.0 $25.0 - $25.0 10.0
Alaska $4.8 - $4.8 - $4.8 100.0
California $1,020.6 $1,020.6 - - - 0.0
Connecticut $160.0 $232.4 ($72.4) - ($72.4) -45.0
District of Columbia $32.0 $36.0 ($4.0) - ($4.0) -13.0
Florida $203.9 $128.1 $75.8 - $75.8 37.0
Georgia $249.0 $228.0 $21.0 - $21.0 8.0
Idaho $1.0 $1.4 ($0.4) - ($0.4) -43.0
Indiana $185.5 $131.2 $54.3 - $54.3 29.0
Iowa $8.6 $1.8 $6.8 - $6.8 79.0
Kentucky $133.8 $86.6 $47.2 - $47.2 35.0
Louisiana $613.8 $74.2 $539.6 - $539.6 88.0
Maryland $40.4 $40.2 $0.2 - $0.2 0.0
Massachusetts $242.7 $91.2 ($91.2) $242.6 $151.5 62.0
Michigan $244.5 $196.5 $48.0 - $48.0 20.0
Mississippi $139.4 $35.5 $17.2 $86.7 $103.9 75.0
Missouri $280.1 $102.1 $178.0 - $178.0 64.0
Nebraska $6.1 $8.5 ($2.4) - ($2.4) -39.0
New Jersey $577.0 $699.0 ($432.0) $310.0 ($122.0) -21.0
North Dakota $0.7 $0.3 $0.4 - $0.4 52.0
Ohio $363.0 $290.9 $72.1 - $72.1 20.0
Oklahomad $16.6 $1.0 $15.6 - $15.6 94.0
Oregone $8.6 $11.6 ($3.0) - ($3.0) -35.0
South Carolina $262.0 $198.3 $63.7 - $63.7 24.0
Texas $830.0 $548.0 $282.0 - $282.0 34.0
(continued on next page)
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Gains to Gains to State Net Percent of
Total  Private or Nonstate State Residual State Gain
DSH Gains Entitiesa Entitiesa Fundsb Gain to Statec
Utah $2.7 $1.4 $1.3 - $1.3 49.0
Vermont $15.2 $24.5 ($9.3) - ($9.3) -61.0
Virginia $97.2 $17.8 $79.4 - $79.4 82.0
Washington $176.0 $93.7 $19.9 $62.4 $82.3 47.0
West Virginia $58.9 $50.3 $8.7 - $8.7 15.0
Wisconsin $6.6 $8.7 ($2.1) - ($2.1) -32.0
Wyoming $0.1 $0.1 ($0.1) - ($0.1) -56.0
Source: Urban Institute, Survey of UPL and DSH Programs, 2002
Notes:
aDSH payments to both acute care and mental hospitals are combined for each ownership type shown.
bResidual funds are state revenues received in excess of the amount needed to draw down the maximum amount of federal funds available based on each state’s
reported total DSH payments. In states taking in excess funding, the [Urban Institute] authors cut back the level of funding reported from each source (for
example, private, local or state) proportionate to the levels reported to estimate the amounts used to draw down federal matching funds. The amount of federal
matching funds needed was estimated based on total DSH payments.
cThese percentages represent the share of total gains from DSH, including residual funds, that are kept by state entities.
dGains to state-owned acute-care hospitals in Oklahoma include payments to a former state operated hospital that has entered into a joint
operating agreement with a private hospital system.
eOregon did not provide revenue or payment information for the state’s mental health DSH program in its survey response, but the state
makes approximately $17 million in DSH payments to mental hospitals annually, according to CMS data.
APPENDIX — TABLE 3 (continued)
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State Share of DSH Revenues 1993a 1997b 2001b
Provider Taxes and Donations 48.4 18.2 11.6
County/Local Fundsc 27.0 42.0 47.2
State Fundsd 24.7 39.8 41.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Federal Percentage of DSH Revenues 49.4 52.2 54.4
DSH Expenditures
Payback to Private and County/Local 38.1 28.8 26.8
Private and County/Local Gain 17.6 27.4 38.6
Payback to State 12.5 19.0 18.8
State Hospital Gain 17.9 14.3 9.2
Residual Funds for State Use 13.8 10.5 6.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Urban Institute, Survey of State Medicaid DSH and Other Payment Programs.
aBased on 1993 survey data from 31 states (which differ slightly from states in other years).
bBased on 1997 and 2001 survey data from 27 states. Percentages differ from those in Table 1, which
includes 32 states.
cCounty/local funds include both intergovernmental transfers and certified public expenditures from
county or local hospitals or entities.
dState funds include both certified public expenditures and state transfers.
APPENDIX — TABLE 4
Distribution of DSH Program Revenues and Expenditures
(in percent)
